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A Report on Canada's Conspiracy Law
Albert C. Gourley*

I. Introduction
The history and evolution of Canada's competition law,
particularly as a comparison with American antitrust law, is an
interesting study. Canadian law is worded in a similar way to section
1 of the Sherman Act. 1 In essence, Canadian law makes illegal any
agreement or arrangement that unduly lessens competition. The
Sherman Act has been read to require an unreasonable restraint of
trade. The wording is not all together different and one might assume
that the courts would demonstrate a similar disposition towards their
interpretation. That, however, has not been the case.
Canadian competition lawyers will proudly tell their
American brethren that our legislation was passed one year before the
law
lawtheir
or antitrust
fact,world.
it wasHowever,
the first competition
Sherman
Act. 2inInthe
brow fades
the shine of
to be passed
* Partner, Macleod Dixon, LLP (Toronto Office); the efforts of Huy Do, Peter
Cho and Viktor Hohots in the preparation of this report are gratefully
acknowledged. In addition, William C. Holmes kindly offered some comments on
the report, which, among other things, helped to improve the accuracy of our
discussion of American antitrust law; William Stanbury offered useful guidance on
performing initial research; and J. Anthony VanDuzer suggested some reference
sources that otherwise might have been missed. This report is based, in part, on an
article by the author, who was commissioned along with two others to each write a
study on the history of Canadian conspiracy laws and to recommend a proposal for
reform for the Commissioner of Competition. The papers can be accessed at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct02277e.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
The first piece of Canadian competition law legislation was introduced by
Parliament in 1889 and was called "An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of
Combinations formed in Restraint of Trade," S.C. 1889, c. 41 (Can.). The
legislation was introduced in a common law environment in which conspirators
could seek the assistance of Canadian courts in forcing "cheaters" to adhere to
formal price-fixing or output limitation agreements: Ont. Salt v. Merch. Salt Co.,
18 Gr. 540 (1871).
2
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quite quickly when they begin to talk about the enforcement record.

II. The Canadian Enforcement Record
A. General
The law has changed very little since its inception. Most of
the modifications have been in the nature of clarifications through the
addition of subsections to what is now section 45(1) of the
Competition Act. Over the period of 1890 to 1969, a period where
there are comparable statistics in Canada and the United States, there
were over 1,200 conspiracy prosecutions in the U.S. compared to
only 70 in Canada. 3 Since 1975, Canada only had 22 cases, 4 and most
3 See W.T. STANBURY, CHAPTER 6 - LEGISLATION TO
CONTROL AGREEMENTS
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN CANADA: REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE

CENTENARY 128 (R. S. Khemani & W. T. Stanbury, ed., Halifax: Institute for
Research on Public Policy) (1991). For the period of 1991-1999 (a more recent
period for which statistics were available), Canada had 22 cases compared to over
500 in the U.S. See U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload
Statistics: FY 1991-2000, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/7344.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2002); H. Chandler and R. Jackson, Beyond Merriment and Diversion: The
Treatment of Conspiracies Under Canada's Competition Act, at
http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct01767e.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002). Note
that, until 1900, only "unlawful" conspiracies were illegal, which effectively
rendered the Canadian legislation unenforceable. See STANBURY, supra, at 63. The
term "conspiracy" is used throughout this report to mean all agreements or
arrangements between or among two or more competitors that might be captured
by the language of the Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45 (1985) (Can.)
(when read without the words "unduly" or "unreasonably"), the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §1 (2001), or the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 81(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome],
irrespective of the impact of such agreement or arrangement on competition. While
recognizing the potential scope of our definition, it is suggested that little turns on
it.
4 Another possible explanation for the low number of conspiracy cases in
Canada is that our prosecutors have done a better job of filtering out those cases
that do not impact competition and, therefore, do not merit prosecution. There are,
however, a variety of reasons to doubt such an argument. First, more detailed
statistics demonstrate that of the 38 cases for which we have market share data,
only 4 appear to have involved market shares of less than 70%; and of the 41 cases
for which we have data, over half of those cases (25) have been transparent (i.e.,
notorious or apparent conspiracies). I have considered agreements or arrangements
to be "transparent" where either the formation of the alleged conspiracy was
transparent to the outside world or the operation of the alleged conspiracy was
transparent to the outside world. On the basis of such data, I would suggest that the
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of those were what we might call American "tag along" cases.
Clearly the smaller economy in Canada explains the gap to some
extent, but perhaps a fairer comparison is to look at the relative
number of markets in Canada compared to the U.S., and the mix of
industry in Canada versus the U.S. On that basis there is a lot more in
common
5 with the U.S. than there would be in terms of the economic
output.
So what accounts for Canada's poor record of prosecutions?
One has to understand that there has been a feeling in Canada for a
long time that bigger just might be better. 6 We have had the influence
of the Irvings, the McCains, the Thompsons, and more recently the
Blacks, where capital has aggregated in very concentrated hands.
And those families that have aggregated wealth have generally
exercised their power in a fair manner and invested in Canada. They
created employment and development that otherwise might not have
occurred. And those families instilled in the Canadian psyche
somewhat of a comfort with the aggregation of power in an
aristocratic elite. Power as such was not a problem, provided it was
Crown's threshold for commencing actions against conspirators has been very high
and most prosecutions have "cried out" for action.
5 STANBURY, supra note 3, at 67-69. Stanbury would argue that the ratio of
18:1 does not reflect the relative sizes of our two economies (approximately 10:1)
and, further, that the ratio should be even lower than the relative size of our two
economies might suggest because the number of markets in Canada, as well as the
mix of industries, is much higher as a percentage of the number of markets and mix
of industries in the United States.
6 See Competition Policy in Canada: Past and Future (Backgrounder for
Canadian Competition Policy - Preparingfor the Future) (2001), at 2, at http://
www.ivey.ca/competitionconference2001/proceedings2/ConfSpeech-eng.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002) (The framers of the original competition legislation in 1889
did not object to power as such, but rather to its abuse. They believed that Canada
as a whole would benefit from large aggregations of capital (such was the means to

a higher standard of living for the nation), but recognized that with size came
responsibility: consumers, workers and competitors must not be exploited.); E.
Clark, The Dynamic between Domestic Competition and International
Competitiveness, at 2-3, at http://www.ivey.ca/competitionconference2001/
proceedings2/ConfSpeech-eng.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); A.M. Rugman, The
Impact of Globalisation on Canadian Competition Policy, at 9, at htp://
www.ivey.ca/competitionconference200l/proceedings2/ConfSpeech-eng.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002). Hence, C. GREEN, CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
AND POLICY 298 (3d ed., Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson 1990), might be correct
when he posits that, "One imagines that the word 'unduly' was thrust into the 1889
legislation just because the protectionist spirit made 'too much' competition
suspect. Combinations were acceptable so long as they did not become a total bar
to competition. This mentality has not disappeared."
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not abused.
The problem, or the difference perhaps, between Canada and
the U.S. is that, unlike the U.S., Canada has not experienced the same
degree of a substantial middle-class - by which I mean a successful
entrepreneurial middle-class - until very recently. And this has left
Canada with a feeling that it is far more concerned with the abuse of
power than its aggregation.
So what does all this mean in relation to conspiracy law? I
suspect it is one of the reasons why the courts have never interpreted
the law as having a per se standard. There is no such thing as a per se
illegal conspiracy in Canada. The courts have always indicated that
they need to look at the particular facts of the case and determine
whether, in fact, the conspiracy was harmful. In some cases, you do
find empathy by the courts that prices were too low and the
conspiracy did have the effect of stabilizing and raising prices, or that
a nasty new entrant was predatorily pricing its products. Thus today,
one must prove in Canada that a conspiracy unduly harmed
competition in every case with economists, market share analysis,
market definition, etc., and this accounts for our very poor record on
enforcement.
B.

Macleod Dixon LLP's Report for the Commissioner of
Competition

Macleod Dixon LLP was recently commissioned by the
Commissioner of Competition to write a comparative study on the
history 7of competition laws and to recommend a proposal for
reform. We began our work with a fundamental question: Is
Canada's conspiracy law working effectively? After considerable
research and study, we concluded that the law is not effective.
Further, we concluded that the law has never been very effective and
may be even less effective in the future.
In the course of looking at the history of our enforcement
record, one of the starkest things that we found was that since 1975
there were only seven cases that did not involve a virtual monopoly
or monopoly market share. 8 In every single one of those cases, the

7 Albert C. Gourley, A Report on Canada'sConspiracy Laws: 1889-2001 and

Beyond, Aug. 2001, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/gourleyrep.pdf (last

visited Mar. 1, 2002).
8 Id. at 5. Our study has placed in this category all cases involving market
shares of 90% or more, as well as those in which the court indicated that the
participants in the alleged conspiracy had a "virtual monopoly."
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Crown lost. 9 Just to demonstrate this problem of market definition, in
1995 there was a case involving rail freight forwarding that the
Crown lost. All of the companies that were involved in the rail freight
forwarding business had conspired to fix prices. The Crown lost
because they failed to demonstrate to the
0 court that rail freight
market.l
relevant
the
constituted
forwarding
One of the other things that is quite stark in Canada, and it
contrasts quite dramatically with the U.S., is the record of fines in
Canada. In 1990, which was not too long ago, the Competition
Bureau announced its record-setting fine for bid rigging. It was a
CDN$3.4 million fine (in the aggregate) and the level of commerce
involved was a half billion dollars over 121 ears. It is hard to
conclude that such fines act as a deterrent. Our report to the
Commissioner looked at this history and the economics of
prosecuting price fixing and concluded that times have changed and
so should the law.

III. The Economics of Enforcement
A. General
Economists almost universally agree that "hard core"
conspiracies contribute little net benefit to society. 12 Some
conspiracies do not materially harm our economy, however, because
the parties lack the requisite market power to impact on competition.
As stated by Hovenkamp:
If a town contains ten similar grocers, and three of them
jointly run a newspaper advertisement quoting retail prices,
the arrangement would reduce advertising costs for each of

9 Id. Only post-1975 cases in relation to which we were able to identify the
participants' market share(s) were included.
10 See R. v. Clarke Transp. Can. Inc., 130 D.L.R. (4th) 500 (1995).
" Moreover, the Commissioner of Competition pointed out that these results
were achieved through effective immunity programs and guilty pleas. In contrast,
the Crown's record on contested cases has been abysmal.
12 See M.J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN
COMPETITION POLICY [to be published], Chap. 3 at 1; P.L. Warner & M.J.
Trebilcock, Rethinking Price-Fixing Law, 38 MCGILL L.J. 679, 683-84 (1993);
Competition Bureau, Competition Policy Considerationsin the GATS Negotiations
[draft], at 7, available at http://www.strategis.gc.calSSI/ctlgats.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2002).
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the three. Furthermore, three grocers out of ten could not
plausibly fix prices. Customers would buy from the other
7

13

One policy debate therefore revolves around the need, and
indeed desire, of prohibiting and prosecuting conspiracies that do not
materially impact on competition because the conspiring parties do
not have market power.
B. Benefits of Impact Analysis
Obviously, the principal benefit associated with a rule of
reason or undue competition impact analysis is the increased
likelihood that costs associated with prosecuting cases that do not
pose any harm to society (hereinafter "Gray Costs") will be
avoided. We believe that such costs would be relatively small
because:
*

It can generally be assumed that "hard core" conspiracies will not
be proposed by businessmen and women who do not believe that
they will be effective, although that is no certainty that
conspiracies entered into will be effective;' 5 and

0

We would expect the Crown to exercise prosecutorial discretion
to settle many of the cases where a conspiracy clearly had no
effect on the economy by offering inducements, such as an
13

H. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

193 (2d ed. 1999). See also

E.T. SULLIVAN & J.L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 86 (Matthew Bender 1988).
14 R.A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 128-29 (1974) ("[W]hile it is doubtless true that
firms would not enter into price-fixing conspiracies if they were convinced they
would not succeed, they may sometimes be mistaken, and such mistakes, even if
rare, could account for a large proportion of the small number of price-fixing cases
that the enforcement agencies bring.").
15 See id.; HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 214 (citing Am. Column & Lumber
Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921)); Brook Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco,
113 S. Ct. 2578, 2605 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he professional
performers who had danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better able to
predict whether their favorite partners would follow them in the future than would
be an outsider who might not know the difference between Haydn and Mozart.").
In some cases, Canadian conspirators have been prosecuted before they achieved
sufficient agreement within the relevant industry to exercise joint market power.
Such cases do not stand for the proposition, however, that the conspirators intended
to implement an agreement that had little chance of success.
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agreement to recommend a discharge,
conditional discharge,
6
prohibition order or small fine.'
We further believe that the Gray Costs are significantly
exceeded by the costs associated with maintaining our present undue
standard (hereinafter "Present Costs"). 17
The Commissioner (and his predecessors) also exercises considerable
discretion in determining those cases that are referred to the Attorney General for
prosecution. See Director of Investigation and Research, Bureau of Competition
Policy, Annual Report for the Period Ending March 31, 1990, at 67 (1990)
("Geralton Hairdressers": resolved by public retraction of joint advertisement);
Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Annual Report for the Period
Ending March 31, 1999, at 24 (1999) ("Regional Building Contracts: Bid-rigging":
resolved by undertaking of firms not to engage in activities again); Director of
Investigation and Research, Bureau of Competition Policy, Annual Report for the
Period Ending March 31, 1998, at 9 and Table 3 (1998) ("Conspiracy": resolved by
negotiations leading to termination of agreements; "Dry Cleaning Services":
resolved by undertakings; "Septic Tanks": resolved by undertakings; "Taxis":
resolved by undertakings); Director of Investigation and Research, Combines
Investigation Act, Annual Report for the Year Ended March 31, 1958, at 26 (1958)
("Sand and Gravel": resolved by negotiations leading to termination of
agreements); Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act,
Annual Report for the Year Ended March 31, 1978, at 50 (1978) ("Taxi Cab
Services - Chatham, New Brunswick": application for a prohibition order); Director
of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, Annual Report for the
Year Ended March 31, 1953, at 19 (1953) ("Winnipeg Bread Report"). See also
J.A. VanDuzer and G. Paquet, Anticompetitive Pricing Practices and the
Competition Act: Theory, Law and Practice, Part III at 7 (Oct. 1999), available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/vdreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
17 Some might argue that a further benefit of an impact analysis is
the
protection of certain efficiency generating conspiracies. Nevertheless, our focus in
this part is on "hard core" cartels, rather than conspiracies that offer potential for
economic benefits. See T. Kennish and T.W. Ross, Toward a New Canadian
Approach to Agreements Between Competitors, 28 CAN. Bus. L.J. 22, 24 (1997),
who argue that Canadian conspiracy law is too restrictive at present and "does not
properly take account of the almost endless possibilities for economically efficient
co-operation among firms that may happen to be competitors." Yet, Kennish and
Ross do not argue that "garden-variety price fixing, bid-rigging and market
allocation schemes" ought to be defended on this basis. Id. at 27. See also F.M.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, available in
T.W. DUNFEE AND F.F. GIBSON, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION 56-58
(1980) ("[I]f pooling indivisible resources or cooperating in research and
development is genuinely advantageous, it is usually worth doing without the
additional encumbrance of price-fixing or market-sharing agreements. The need for
cartelized cooperation is especially small in a market as vast as the United States,
where the conflict between scale economies and competition is seldom acute.");
R.H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 263 (1978) ("The efficiencies arising from
16
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C. Costs of Impact Analysis
Some of the Present Costs include:
0

The cost to Canadian society of an increased number of
conspiracies that harm our economy, which would likely be
higher in number than under a per se standard because of the:
> increased uncertainty of the law, which would likely lead
some to consummate
such conspiracies that otherwise
18
would not;
> likely increase in the failure of the Crown to prosecute
such conspiracies
because they are considered "difficult"
19
cases;
> likely increase in the failure of the Crown to prove, or the
courts to accept, that the conspiracy would unduly20lessen
or prevent competition beyond a reasonabledoubt;

a naked price-fixing or market-division agreement, if any ever do arise, must be so
minor that the law is justified in ignoring them."). Note that the Supreme Court of
Canada was clear in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Soc'y, 2 S.C.R. 606, 650
(S.C.C. 1992), aff'g 36 C.P.R. (3d) 173 (N.S.C.A.), rev'g 32 C.P.R. (3d) 259
(N.S.S.C.) [hereinafter PANS] that our present undue inquiry "does not permit a
full-blown discussion of the economic advantages and disadvantages of the
agreement, like a rule of reason [approach] would."
18 STANBURY, supra note 3, at 96 ("Where the accused have taken an
economic approach they take into account such variables as the probability of being
caught, convicted and penalized; the likely increase in profits attributable to an
agreement with competitors; and the likely lag between the time the benefits are
received and the costs are incurred."); BORK, supra note 17, at 263 ("The subject of
cartels lies at the center of antitrust policy. The law's oldest and, properly qualified,
most valuable rule [in the U.S.] states it is illegal per se for competitors to agree to
limit rivalry among themselves. We have already discussed... the great cases that
established and elaborated this doctrine .... There are, of course, hundreds of other
cases in which the doctrine of per se illegality for eliminations of rivalry (e.g., price
fixing and market division) has been applied, and without doubt thousands have
never been broached because of the overhanging threat of this rule. Its
contributions to consumer welfare over the decades have been enormous."); see
also M.K. Block et al, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J.POL.
ECON. 429 (1981); R.M. Feinberg, Antitrust Enforcement and Subsequent Price
Behaviour, 62 THE REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 609 (1980); R.D. BLAIR AND D.L.
KASERMAN, ANTITRUST EcONOMICS 157-60 (1985); G.J. Stigler, The Economic
Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & EcON. 225 (1966).
19 See supra Part Ill. B.
20

PANS, supra note 17, is an instructive example, where the Crown proved
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"Transactional" costs, such as:
> the increased cost of advising businesses on the law of
conspiracy in Canada, given its complexity and
uncertainty;2
> the increased likelihood that such advice will not
correspond with international antitrust standards, such as
those in the United States and Europe, and the associated
cost of restructuring relationships to adhere to such
international standards; 22 and

that the agreement would lessen competition unduly beyond a reasonable doubt,
but could not prove that a reasonable business person ought to have known that
such an impact would occur beyond a reasonable doubt.
21 See Scherer, supra note 17, at 56-58 ("A relatively unimportant cost [using
a rule of reason standard] would be the increased uncertainty business firms would
face as to which agreements are illegal. At least in borderline areas, it would be
impossible to proceed with confidence until the enforcement agencies or judiciary
has rendered an opinion. This is not a serious problem, however, for companies
could always avoid legal uncertainty by refraining from brinkmanship. In so doing,
they would be no worse off than under a per se rule prohibiting all clear-cut
restrictions."). In our experience, however, these costs are not insignificant. There
is no doubt that Canadian businesses have incurred significant expenditures for
legal advice directly attributable to the uncertainty of our conspiracy law. They
have suffered from the inability of counsel to give them clear directions on the
treatment under our Competition Act of joint ventures, strategic alliances, ancillary
restraints and other matters, as well as the cost of retaining counsel to draft and
review such agreements so as to ensure that their pro-competitive intentions will be
made manifest and obvious to a reader. While some speculated that the decision in
PANS, supra note 17, helped to clarify the law, we do not share this view. Indeed,
it could be argued that Justice Gonthier actually muddied the waters in suggesting
that "[a] particularly injurious behaviour may also trigger liability even if market
power is not so considerable" and "[p]arties to the agreement need not have the
capacity to influence the market[, but rather w]hat is more relevant is the capacity
to behave independently of the market, in a passive way." PANS, 2 S.C.R. at 657,
654. We would suggest that those words will be made great use of in the coming
years and continue the trend toward more prolonged and complicated court
proceedings. In fact, Clarke Transport, supra note 10, is evidence of such trend. In
the past, opinions as to the appropriate level of market share that will be
condemned as undue ranged anywhere from 35% to 90%. We tend to think that
both ends of the spectrum could be defended on a rational basis, depending on the
circumstances, including the judge that hears the case. See GREEN, supra note 6, at
260 ("[T]he agreeing sellers must account for at least 80 to 90 percent of industry
output in the relevant market.").
22 Canada's conspiracy law enables our business community to adopt
structures and arrangements that are not permitted outside our borders, which may
have the impact of stifling economic expansion because of the cost of reshaping
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The additional cost of litigating conspiracy cases23 because of the
increased complexity of the adjudication process.

Naturally, these costs are difficult to quantify, but we believe
that they would exceed the Gray Costs referred to in Part III. B. 24

IV.

Macleod Dixon LLP'S Recommendations to the

Commissioner
Accordingly, Macleod Dixon LLP recommended that
25
Canada's law of conspiracy be reformed by making per se illegal

such structures and agreements to suit foreign laws. See International Antitrust
Draft Code Working Group, Draft InternationalAntitrust Draft Code as a GA1TMTO-PlurilateralTrade Agreement, 65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REP., at
S-3 ("In the globalized economy the law of many nations applies to the same
transaction and the law of each nation has somewhat different requirements and
standards. The disharmonies are sand in the gears of smooth and efficient market
transactions. They increase the costs of business and deter some salutary
transactions.").
23 See Scherer, supra note 17, at 56-58 ("If the expanded rule of reason
approach required to implement this policy were itself costless, it should be
adopted. But it is not costless. There are definite costs in the form of added
uncertainty, more complex adjudication, and an enhanced probability of irrational
and erroneous choices .... A thorough investigation of this sort conducted under
traditional antitrust procedures would be so costly in terms of money and, more
important, high-level talent that the enforcement agencies would find the number of
cases they could initiate sharply limited."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 193;
GREEN, supra note 6, at 262. Note that the number of days of trial in a conspiracy
case can be enormous. In R. v. Ash-Temple Co., O.R. 315 (Ont. C.A. 1949), the
trial lasted 55 days; Howard Smith Paper Mills, Ltd. v. The Queen, 8 D.L.R. (2d)
449 (S.C.C. 1957), affg 4 D.L.R. 225 (Ont. C.A. 1955), affig 4 D.L.R. 161 (Ont.
Ct. Just. 1954), R. v. Can. Packers Inc., 19 C.P.R. (3d) 133 (Alta. Q.B. 1988) and
Clarke Transport, supra note 10, the trial days were over 6 months, 95 days, 1.5
years and 40 days, respectively. In the latter case, the Crown was criticized for not
presenting more evidence with regard to the relevant market.
24 See also infra note 36.
We note that the concept of per se illegality in the Canadian competition
law context is nothing new. For example, the Competition Act makes it per se
illegal to set prices in response to a bid tender (section 47), to agree (as between or
among financial institutions) on interest rates and certain other things (section 49)
and to discriminate in pricing in certain instances (section 50(l)(a)). A somewhat
harsh per se provision is section 61, which makes it an offence for any person "to
attempt to upwardly influence" the price charged by any other person, which could
have vertical and horizontal application.
25
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"hard core" cartels. 26 We believe that the legislative model ought to
capture those types of conspiracies that offer little chance of
offsetting efficiency benefits, while "releasing" from the net those
cooperative agreements and arrangements that have potential for
efficiency generating or other benefits. We further believe that "hard
core" cartels should not be treated using a rule of reason,27 shifted

26

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 83, 88-89, who describes the classic

"hard core" cartels as follows:
The simplest cartel is an agreement among perfect competitors to sell all their
output at the same, agreed upon price ....
[S]ome industries may be more
conducive to output restriction agreements, in which the members decide how
much each should produce and sell, but the market itself determines the
price ....
An alternative to the output reduction agreement is the agreement on
market share, with penalties for firms that exceed their assigned shares ....
Such an
agreement can be far more flexible than a strict output reduction agreement,
because it enables the parties to deal with sudden changes in demand for the
product without consulting each other (which can be dangerous!) ....
Horizontal
territorial division can be an effective method of cartelization, although it works in
relatively few markets ....
One problem with such territorial division, however, is
that outsiders can often see what is happening.
In the United States, "The Department of Justice prosecutes participants in hardcore cartel agreements criminally" and the "[t]ypes of agreements that have been
held per se illegal include agreements among competitors to fix prices or output,
rig bids, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or
lines of commerce." While the concept of a "hard core cartel" is not defined with
vivid lines, it appears to rest on whether or not the parties can point to an
"efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity" for which the challenged
agreement is "reasonably related" and "reasonably necessary to achieve its
procompetitive benefits"; if not, and if the challenged conduct is of a type
otherwise subject to traditional per se standards, it is deemed a "naked" restraint
subject to criminal prosecution.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among
Competitors, § 3.2
(Apr. 2000),
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
27 Under a rule of reason analysis, "the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into
account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant
business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect." W.C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 304-05
n.7 (1999) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997), citing Bd. of Trade
of Chi. v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). See also PANS, 2 S.C.R. at 650.
Holmes points out that "[t]he distinction between practices deemed per se illegal,
and those that are instead to be judged by the rule of reason or by some
intermediate standard, is anything but immutable. These have not been easy
categories for the courts to define, let alone to apply. As a result, practices that have
at one time been analyzed under one test have later been brought under an
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burden impact analysis, 28 or any other sort of system requiring an
economic analysis because we are of the view that many of the costs
identified in Part III. C would not be avoided using any such
standard.
We proposed a detailed code ("Draft Code") to try to
accomplish this goal. Without going into the details of the Draft
Code, our basic proposition is that the net that ought to catch
agreements and arrangements of interest and possible criminal
29 to fix, stabilize or affect prices,
prosecution
those
that attempt
eliminate or are
restrict
capacity,
output or
supply, 30 impede expansion or

altogether different standard." HOLMES, supra, at 305-06.
28 Scherer, supra note 17, at 58-59 ("A second proposal is credited to
Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim. He has suggested that instead of holding
price-fixing agreements per se illegal, they be considered prima facie illegal. In
order to escape censure, price fixers would then bear the burden of proving that
their agreements do not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade. This approach
has the merit of forcing the parties with the closest knowledge of internal industry
workings to carry forward most of the positive economic analysis. If there is
information that might vindicate their conduct, the members of an industry are in a
position to supply it. Conversely, it is much more difficult for a government
enforcement agency to obtain evidence needed to prove an agreement's
unreasonableness. Yet despite its advantages from an enforcement standpoint, a
primafacie rule does not solve the problem of continuing surveillance, nor does it
overcome the judiciary's inability to deal analytically with the evidence, once it has
been assembled.") (emphasis added).
29 The Draft Code would render per se illegal all those agreements or
arrangements having the purpose or effect of fixing pricing or otherwise harming
competition. As such, the scope of our legislative model would be somewhat
broader than existing law, which would not make criminal those poorly designed
agreements that, while intended to unduly impact on competition, failed to do so.
See, e.g., Clarke Transport, supra note 10. Under the Treaty of Rome, supra note
3, it has been held that the "object" of the agreement "is to be found by an objective
assessment of the aims of the agreement in question, and it is unnecessary to
investigate the parties' subjective intentions." BELLAMY & CHILD: COMMON
MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 90-91 (V. Rose ed., 4th ed. 1993). Subsequent to

PANS, supra note 17, we would expect Canadian courts to look to the wording of
the agreement, along with other indicia, as objective evidence of the subjective
intent of the parties, but would not anticipate the courts avoiding the exercise of
determining such intent altogether. An interesting case would be one in which the
clear intention of one of the parties to the agreement was to harm competition,
while the clear intention of all other parties was completely different.
30 Some would argue that the only sure way of affecting prices in a market is
to address output. Accordingly, it is imperative that output limitations be captured
in the per se net.
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entry, 3' or allocate, cease to supply or purchase, or otherwise effect
relations with customers or suppliers. 32 Now obviously that is a very
broad net and it would include, in some cases, charging a premium,
eliminating discounts, production quotas, group boycotts, and
certainly price fixing. It might also catch price information exchanges
that were made for the purpose of effecting prices, or agreements to
published recommended prices, like catalogue prices, and perhaps
even marketing joint ventures. There is some resemblance between
our Draft Code and Article 81.1 of the Treaty of Rome, particularly
with the combined purpose or effect test.
The Draft Code then goes about the business of mitigation trying to release from the net agreements that ought to be considered
under a civil standard or automatically released. 33 First, there is an
ancillary restraint exemption. 34 Should the Draft Code be adopted, we
would be left with literally no litigation, no case law, no basis on
which to assume there is an ancillary restraint exemption. This
exemption would essentially ensure that any agreement that was not
principally aimed at harming competition and did not have a
substantial impact on competition, was released from the net. So if a
marketing joint venture was part of a general expiration and
development agreement, perhaps in an oil and gas market or mining
context, the fact that the marketing arrangement was peripheral to the

3 Agreements by competitors to deny a market participant entry into a market,
or impede another participant's ability to expand in a market, are forms of output
restrictions that ought to be similarly caught within the per se net.
32 It is trite that the allocation of customers as between or among competitors

falls within the classic description of a "hard core" cartel. The Draft Code would
also capture as prima facie per se illegal all those agreements or arrangements
between or among competitors relating to a refusal to deal with a customer,
supplier or class of customers or suppliers, as well as agreements or arrangements
otherwise affecting relations of either or any of them with one or more of any of
their customers or suppliers.
33 We would also expect the Crown to continue to exercise some judgment
(i.e., prosecutorial discretion) in determining those cases that did or did not merit
the expenditure of government resources to litigate. Further, the decision in PANS,
supra note 17, would continue to stand for the proposition that no conviction can be
entered against an accused who could not reasonably have known the anticompetitive effect of the agreement or arrangement. See supra note 16.
34 An ancillary restraint is a restraint or limitation on competition that is
ancillary to an otherwise lawful or unobjectionable agreement or arrangement. To
be viewed as ancillary, clearly the agreement, arrangement or effect must be
subordinate in importance to the main object of the transaction. See BELLAMY &
CHILD, supra note 29, at 346.
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main object of the agreement, such an arrangement would be released
under this exemption provided it did not have a substantial impact on
competition.
Another exemption that we carved up was a case-by-case
exemption that is the proposed section 46(1)35 and a block exemption
power for the Commissioner under the proposed section 46(6). With
regard to block exemptions, we were very cognizant of the fact that
to replace the competition conspiracy law in Canada would leave us
with literally no case law. It was very important that the
Commissioner be able to bring Canada up to speed with Europe and
the United States, in terms of current economic and legal thinking.
The only way to do that, in our view, is to enable the Commissioner

One of the difficulties in formulating a per se category of offence is the
potential for capturing conduct that was not contemplated or wanted. Given the
myriad of ways in which, inter alia, prices can be affected, supply can be restricted,
expansion can be impeded and relations with customers or suppliers can be affected
as a result of agreements and arrangements between or among competitors, it is
essential that the Commissioner be given the ability to consider, on a case-by-case
basis, those transactions that ought to be exempt from the per se net. We believe
that a clearance process would work well in Canada, provided the following
principles were adhered to:
35

(1) Timing of Notification: The right to seek clearance certificates for agreements
and arrangements at any period of time, including post-execution or
implementation;
(2) Flexibility in Approving Modified Agreements: The ability to seek guidance
from the Commissioner as to how the agreement or arrangement might be modified
to eliminate concerns about its effect;
(3) Timing of ClearanceResponse: The right to receive a response within a limited
period of time;
(4) Factors to be Considered: The ability of the Commissioner and Tribunal to
consider the net overall effect of the transaction on the economy, including
efficiencies and pro-competitive results;
(5) Appeal: The right to have a full hearing before an impartial tribunal on
proposed agreements or arrangements that are not approved by the Commissioner;
(6) Costs: The cost of the exemption application ought to be sufficient in size as to
discourage perfunctory notifications, yet not so large as to impede or discourage
transactions;
(7) Effect: The issuance of a certificate ought to exempt parties from both criminal
and civil liability; and
(8) Confidentiality: The obligation of the Commissioner and his or her staff to
maintain in confidence both the fact of a notification and all materials provided in
support of a certificate request.
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to carve specific exemptions. Ultimately, the Draft Code was
designed to ensure that pro-competitive strategic alliances, joint
ventures and possibly even industry restructurings would be
permitted, provided the object was not to harm competition and the
effect was not substantial.

V. Summary and Conclusions
The Canadian record in the enforcement of conspiracies is not
impressive. The total number of cases in which the Crown has
advanced proceedings does not significantly exceed the number of
years in which the law has been available for prosecution, while the
total number of cases in which the Crown has successfully litigated a
conspiracy case is less than thirty. Moreover, during the last twentyfive years, the Crown lost all seven litigated cases that did not
involve a monopoly or "virtual monopoly." While the expenditure of
resources on conspiracies that do not materially harm our economy is
of concern in any effort to reform the law, 36 on balance the economic
thinking tends to support a per se approach to "hard core" cartel
behavior.
Accordingly, we believe that amendments to the law of
conspiracy are necessary and we would make certain types of
conspiratorial conduct per se illegal. We have attempted to outline a
workable model for legislative reform in this report, which we have
termed the Draft Code, which features the following basic structural
components:
(1)

A per se net capturing only a limited category of agreements
and arrangements having the object or effect of affecting
prices, output, expansion, entry, customers or suppliers in
respect of a market;

(2)

A broader civil net enabling the Commissioner to take action
against all agreements or arrangements having the effect of
substantially affecting competition, regardless of whether or
not such agreement or arrangement falls within the per se net;

(3)

An automatic release from the per se net of certain types of
agreements and arrangements arising from transactions that

36 While one could argue that the resources are not completely wasted, since

the litigation process itself is a deterrent, the offsetting factor is the impact on the
behavior of the business community of the unsuccessful prosecution. The net effect
is difficult to assess in the abstract.
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are not aimed at harming competition and could not be
reasonably foreseen to harm competition; and
(4)

A clearance mechanism enabling the Commissioner to
develop block exemptions reflecting current economic and
legal thinking with regard to conspiracies, as well as release
specifically notified and socially desirable agreements or
arrangements from the per se net.

So where is Canada going? After our report was tabled, along
with two others, the Commissioner indicated that the debate should
begin. He first sponsored a conference where competition lawyers
were asked for their views. Secondly, he indicated that conspiracy
reform would be considered at the top of the legislative reform
priority. All this points to an active policy agenda for conspiracy
reform in 2002, and it is likely that there will be legislation tabled in
the House of Commons before 2004. Unlike previous attempts to
modify section 45, and there have been a few to create a per se
offence 37 for hard-core cartels, the mood in Canada has shifted. It
shifted along with an increasing American export focus, and an
increasing ownership of Canadian companies by American interests.
The trend and the need for convergence is both high and beneficial.

37 Calls for reforming Canadian conspiracy laws have gone unheeded from as

far back as 1969 when the Economic Council of Canada recommended a per se
prohibition in respect of certain collusive arrangements. In 1971, Bill C-256, which
again advocated adopting a per se approach for enumerated categories, was
withdrawn after being attacked by the business community. More recently, Bill C472 proposed certain changes to section 45 through a Private Members' Bill that
was part of the Public Policy Forum consultation process in 2000.

